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Resumen Antes de definir el populismo, es importante identificar las principales culturas polí-
ticas en las democracias contemporáneas occidentales. Las culturas políticas pueden 
definirse como conjuntos coherentes de ideologías, que están “un tanto” (es decir, de 
una manera diferente) vinculadas a la promoción de ciertos intereses. La forma concre-
ta en que se vinculan las ideas y los intereses depende de la cultura política particular 
y no puede seleccionarse de manera abstracta para todos ellos (ver más abajo). ¿Cuáles 
son las principales culturas políticas occidentales contemporáneas? Hay dos enfoques 
para responder esta pregunta. El enfoque de los divisores es elaborar una clasificación 
(o tipología) de las ideologías de los partidos. La lista será larga, porque estos instru-
mentos analíticos deben ser exhaustivos. En cambio, el enfoque de los lumpers es el de 
idear modelos, es decir, los tipos ideales de Weber; la lista será mucho más corta, por-
que esas categorías no son exhaustivas e identifican solo aquellos comportamientos que 
obedecen a condiciones de simplicidad y coherencia. Los modelos se han utilizado con 
mayor frecuencia en la fase “moderna” de las ciencias humanas (1950 y 1960), y fueron 
aplicados especialmente por la escuela italiana de ciencias políticas.
Palabras clave Populismo, Patrimonialismo, América Latina, Régimen Híbrido, Democracia Iliberal.
Abstract Populism can be defined as the post-Marxist adaptation of leftist Manicheanism. In 
Western Europe, this process materialized after 1989, while in Latin America populism 
was applied before 1989. Populism is based on: a Manichean ideology with a binary cos-
mology of the world; the expansion of the public expenditure with damaging effects 
(high inflation rates) on the economy; charismatic leaders making plebiscitary appeals 
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to the population, with a limited role of intermediate actors (interests groups or parties) 
and institutions; a high mobilization process from above leading to a movimientismo of 
the lower sectors of the population. The four cases of orthodox macro-economic popu-
lism were: Peron in Argentina, Allende in Chile, Garcia in Peru, and Chavez/Maduro in 
Venezuela. In partial populism, there is plebiscitarianism, but the increase of the public 
expenditure and of the inflation rate remains under control (Syriza, Movimento 5 Stelle, 
Correa, Morales, and Cristina Kirchner). Orthodox populism has always had negative 
consequences in politics, leading to authoritarian regimes, increased conflict and mi-
litary coups; instead, partial populism has never endangered democracy and is usually 
coupled with hybrid/illiberal regimes. The political cultures of the right are not populist, 
because there is not the increase of public expenditure, but there is plebiscitarianism.
Keywords  Populism, Patrimonialism, Latin America, Hybrid Regime, Illiberal Democracy. 
Introduction This article is going to analyze the populist political culture, first by a theoretical point 
of view; then through an empirical analysis of the different populisms in Latin Ameri-
ca. This task will be accomplished after the presentation of the main political cultures 
in contemporary democracies. In the first chapter, a political culture will be defined 
as a mix of interests and/or ideologies. Then, the main contemporary political cultu-
res will be identified: first, the four (the conservative, the liberal, the constructivist/so-
cial-democrat and the Manichean/socialist) “models”; then, the “hybrids” (like the xe-
nophobic and the neo-communist). In the second chapter, populism will be defined as 
the post-Marxist adaptation of leftist Manicheanism, that was the “next best thing” of 
socialism. Thus, the definitions applying the label of populism to (conservative, liberal 
or xenophobic) “plebiscitarian” rightist parties will be criticized. Then, the evolution of 
Latin American (radical and moderate) leftist populist governments will be presented, 
focusing on leaders such as Peron in Argentina, Allende in Chile, Garcia in Peru, Chavez 
and Maduro in Venezuela; Morales in Bolivia, Correa in Ecuador, Nestor and Cristina 
Kirchner in Argentina. In the conclusions, the different radical (orthodox) or moderate 
(partial) Latin American populist governments will be classified within a typology on 
(right and left) plebiscitarian regimes. 
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The main political 
cultures in Western 
democracies
Before defining populism, it is important to identify the main political cultures in Wes-
tern contemporary democracies. Political cultures may be defined as coherent sets 
of ideologies, that are “somewhat” (i.e. in a different way) linked to the promotion of 
certain interests. The concrete way in which ideas and interests are linked depends on 
the particular political culture and cannot be selected in an abstract way for all of them 
(see below). What are the main contemporary Western political cultures? There are two 
approa ches to answering this question. The splitters’ approach is to draw up a classifi-
cation (or typology) of party ideologies. The list will be a long one, because these analy-
tical instruments must be exhaustive. Instead, the lumpers’ approach is that of devising 
models, that is to say Weber’s ideal-types; the list will be much shorter, because those 
categories are not exhaustive, and identify only those behaviors that obey conditions of 
simplicity and coherence. Models have been more often used in the “modern” phase of 
human sciences (the 1950 and 1960’s), and were applied especially by the Italian school 
of political science
Four models of political cultures of Western democracies’ diplomacies have been iden-
tified by Fossati (2017): the conservative, the liberal, the social-democrat, and the socia-
list. Nazi/fascism and communism were not democratic political cultures and are not 
followed anymore in contemporary politics. Each model shows how these political cul-
tures would work at the analytic level. Then, the empirical analysis will show if either 
behaviors rigidly follow one of the models (like the primary colors: white, yellow, red, 
blue, black) or if they disobey them, being flexible, volatile, incoherent, and so on; thus, 
political cultures would turn into (green, orange, violet) hybrids (like the xenophobic or 
the neo-communist). 
Conservatism has been influenced by the realist philosophical tradition; it must not be 
confused with the defense of the status quo (“past-ism”: in French, passéisme). At the be-
ginning of the 1900’s, conservatism was the political culture of those parties, that had 
two main interests; they were against universal suffrage and defended the interests 
of rural producers. When universal suffrage was introduced, and industrial moderni-
zation was consolidated, conservatism focused on two main interests: the defense of 
security of its citizens and the application of moderate laissez faire economic institu-
tions. In fact, conservators have always been in favor of capitalism, but they tried to 
defend national producers (with moderate trade and investments’ protectionism) and 
to oppose blind privatizations, that would increase investments of foreign firms. Secu-
rity has been applied to both the fight against criminal individuals or organizations and 
the strengthening of citizens’ national identity. Thus, conservators have tried to limit 
immigration flows of people with different national identities, according to the ius san-
guinis principle of citizenship; as a consequence, they are against the ius soli principle. 
Then, they have always defended the values of the mainstream heterosexual family, be-
ing against gays’ weddings (and children’s adoptions), and they have rejected the values 
of post-modern feminism, being in favor of divorce, but against abortion. In sum, in 
conservatism interests are more relevant, and subsequently favor the consolidation of 
a nationalist ideology, which differs from Nazi-fascism, because nationalism is “defen-
sive”, but is not imperialist in foreign policy and it is not racist. 
At the beginning of 1900’s, Liberalism was in conflict with conservatism because on one 
hand liberals wanted universal suffrage, and on the other hand they defended urban 
and industrial interests. Then, the liberal parties focused on the defense of certain va-
lues, such as human rights, democracy, free market, and national self/determination. 
Liberals promoted both civil and political rights in Western democracies. Then, liberal 
parties have always supported the free movements of goods and people, and have ob-
jected to limits to migration flows. However, they have always promoted a symmetric 
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integration of immigrants that must respect the laws of the guest country; then, foreign 
countries should apply reciprocity to the legislation on immigrants coming from the 
West. In economy, liberals have always promoted radical laissez faire reforms, by suppor-
ting privatizations and foreign investments. Liberals have also promoted cultural plura-
lism, being in favor of federalism, and/or secessions, if some minorities with different 
cultural identities promote national self-determination through referenda. In fact, libe-
rals have usually been in favor of single-nations states, as cultural pluralism is pre ferred 
to state interests. In sum, liberalism starts with the defense of some values (democracy, 
radical laissez faire, federalism), and then consolidates the interests of actors like bu-
siness groups, pro-human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), national 
self-determination movements. However, liberalism in the West has mostly reached its 
objectives in the promotion of civil and political rights, while in economy it has been 
strong from the 1980’s until the 2008 economic crisis; since then, it has been weakened. 
The leftist moderate political culture has consolidated constructivist values. These have 
usually been the strategies of Social-democrat parties, that have always promoted soli-
darity among classes, to be defended (especially since 1945) through the welfare state. As 
those reforms have been consolidated in Europe (but not in the USA and Australia), af-
ter 1989 the main value of the moderate left has become multi-culturalism, that has been 
applied to decisions concerning both Third World migration flows towards the West, 
and armed conflict resolution processes outside Western Europe. Constructivists have 
promoted free immigration flows, through an asymmetric integration process with im-
migrants, that are not requested to respect the laws of the guest country; then, recipro-
city is not asked to foreign governments when they must defend the rights of Western 
immigrants in the Third World. Then, multi-culturalism has been applied to conflict 
resolution processes, by neglecting national self-determination and referenda outside 
the West, and promoting pluri-national states, based more on consensus pacts than on 
federalism. The ideology of the moderate left has been called political correctness, that is a 
post-modern attitude of leftist intellectuals based on the perception that rational Wes-
tern people can no longer manage reality. Political correctness aims at making equal 
what is different and at not criticizing under-privileged actors (underdogs) through 
language or politics. In economy, the constructivist left has accepted free market, even 
if it should be corrected by a strong state governance: welfare state in domestic politics 
and foreign aid in world politics. Thus, also this political culture starts from values (so-
lidarity though welfare state and multi-culturalism) and then consolidates interests: of 
unions, of NGOs for immigration or foreign aid.
The leftist neo-Marxist philosophy (without the violent inclination of communism), ba-
sed on third-worldism and passive non-violence, has led to a Manichean ideology.  Pre-
1989 Manicheanism has consolidated a socialist political culture, whose parties were in 
favor of democracy (instead of violent communists), but against capitalism and wanted 
to nationalize the private property. In fact, these objectives have never been reached 
within Western democracies, and if socialist parties won the elections, they turned into 
social-democrats. Fully Socialist institutions have been applied only by communist re-
gimes. In Latin America, democratic governments (like Peron in Argentina or Allende 
in Chile) have partially applied socialism (for example in the energy or the agriculture 
sector) before 1989, and coupled it with both trade protectionism (the Import Substitu-
tion Industrialization) and populism, that was based both on a strong increase of public 
expenditure and deep redistributive policies. Both socialists and populists have Mani-
chean cosmologies, because reality is interpreted under two rigid dichotomous cate-
gories (of white-good, black-evil). However, after 1989 the main problem became that 
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there was still the black and the evil (the USA, the West, “neo-liberalismo”), but the white 
and the good were absent: both communism and socialism had failed. In Western ad-
vanced countries, that void was filled by populism1. That’s the reason why populism can 
be defined as the post-Marxist adaptation of leftist Manicheanism. In Western Europe, 
this process materialized after 1989, while in Latin America populism was applied af-
ter the 1929 economic crisis and the Second World War. That continent was under the 
hegemony of the United States, that would have never accepted full socialism within a 
democracy; thus, post-Marxism in Latin America had a strong international constraint 
and its conversion into populism2 has materialized before 1989; only Cuba and Nica-
ragua were communist authoritarian regimes that applied socialist economic institu-
tions. Marxism wanted to favor socio-economic equality through nationalizations and 
the elimination of private property, but socialism has always led to the total failure of 
the economy. Thus, populism has been the “next best thing” of socialism, becoming a 
“post”-Marxist political culture that does not reject free market anymore, but uses the 
expansion of the public expenditure as a tax imposed to the middle and the high clas-
ses to defend the poorest sectors of the society -which in the past was the ultimate ob-
jective of socialism-. Thus, all Manichean actors start from ideas and then consolidate 
interests, that may be defended by socialist parties or populist leaders, or by even more 
rigid (no global, third-worldist, ecologist, feminist, pacifist, animal rights) Manichaean 
movements.
Other political cultures may be identified, by emphasizing the hybrids between two 
models3. In contemporary politics, two relevant hybrids have materialized through 
the combination with two non-democratic political cultures (Nazi-fascism and com-
munism). Neo-communism promoted a “post-modern” synthesis between non-violent 
socialism and revolutionary (or terrorist) communism. In fact, neo-communists are 
not directly violent, but appreciate the ‘violence of the others’ (the underdogs): Castro, 
Chavez, Chiapas rebels. Neo-communism has been stronger in the Cold War but persist-
ed in the 1990’s, and always strongly criticized the use of violence by Western coun-
tries; its outcome was a “false pacifism”, that was promoted by the Italian Communist 
Party (PCI) in the Cold War or by Rifondazione Comunista (RC) with its mobilizations 
against Nato’s wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s. However, if also post-1989 no 
global groups are sympathizers with the use of violence, they become neo-communist. 
At the same time, a hybrid between conservatism and Nazi-Fascism4 has also materi-
alized in recent decades. The so-called Xenophobic radical right has emerged in many 
European countries. It is also called the Alt-Right, that is deeply anti-political correct-
ness. They are against immigration flows, especially from Islamic countries. This politi-
cal culture was strengthened after the terrorist attacks of Al Qaeda and Isis since 2001. 
In the USA it is also called white supremacist extreme right, and its supporters are against 
immigration flows also from Mexico and Latin America. Like neo-communists, xeno-
phobic groups of the extreme right are not directly violent, but their discourse is very 
ambiguous and deeply intolerant. The application of their values may lead to the violence 
of the others (their most radical sympathizers), that is never criticized. 
1. Olson (2018) emphasized that 
socialism has a class identity, whi-
le populism privileges people’s 
identity. 
2. Germani (1978) linked Latin 
American populism to a phase of 
the modernization process, when 
the industrialization process had 
been launched by late (or third) 
comers (Latin American countries) 
after first (Great Britain, USA and 
France), and second (Germany, 
Italy and Japan) comers. Oxhorn 
(1998) linked populism to the high 
social inequalities and the econo-
mic asymmetries in Latin America, 
that has produced a much more 
heterogeneous class structure than 
Western Europe.
3. Neo-conservatism represents a 
hybrid between conservatism and 
liberalism. The Greens are a hybrid 
between the social-democrat and 
the Manichean political cultures. 
Social-Christian parties are a hy-
brid between conservatism and 
social-democracy. The Radicals 
are a hybrid between liberals and 
social-democrats. Anarchism is a 
hybrid between liberalism and Ma-
nicheanism or communism.
4. Communism was based on 
Marxism, with the use of violen-
ce in both the conquest of power 
(through revolutions, coups d’état, or 
terrorism) and in its maintenance 
(through communist regimes). Ins-
tead, Nazi-fascism was based on 
radical nationalism, leading to both 
imperialism (with the promo tion 
of wars against other nations) and 
racism (in their relations with peo-
ple of other civilizations). Weyland 
(2018) has emphasized that the fas-
cist ideology was very dogmatic, 
while populism is much more flexi-
ble and pragmatic. According to 
Roberts (2018), not all radical right 
parties are populist, that is to say 
plebiscitarian, especially those with 
a strong organization structure like 
the Front National in France.
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The definition 
of populism
The populist political culture has the following features: 
 ♦ Populists have a Manichean vision of the world (Hawkins, 2018), that is to say a cos-
mology with a dichotomous, binary, antagonistic division between us and them, the 
good and the evil, the white and the black, the people and the elite, the masses and 
the establishment, the pure and the corrupted5. Leftist Manichean political move-
ments are anti-market, anti-USA, anti-NATO, and anti-West.
 ♦ Populist governments aim at expanding public expenditure to defend those citizens 
that are being excluded by formal work: the unemployed citizens in the West or the 
marginal people in Latin America (Fossati, 1997). Populist parties have never been 
worried of the inflation effects of the expansion of the public expenditure, that in La-
tin America often reached the three-digit level, pushing into deep economic crisis all 
the countries that applied populism. Macro-economic populism has been defined by 
Dornbusch and Edwards (1989) as that economic approach that emphasizes growth 
and income distribution and deemphasizes the risk of inflation and deficit finance, 
external constraints and the reaction of economic agents to aggressive non-market 
policies. Economic populism has been coupled with trade and investments’ protec-
tionism, influenced by economic nationalism6, but nationalism has affected not only 
populism, but also the conservative right’s ideology. Kaufman and Stallings (1991) 
emphasized three features of economic populism: budget deficits, price controls and 
nominal wage increase, controlled or appreciated exchange rate. The common out-
come of pre-1989 macro-economic populism has been the ultimate collapse of the 
economy, with a frightening cost to the popular groups who were supposed to be 
favored, with violent real wage cuts that ended in massive political instability. For its 
evolution in Latin America, see the following sections. 
 ♦ The political feature of populism is plebiscitarianism, that is to say the direct appeal of 
charismatic leaders to the masses, without any strong intermediate actors (parties or 
interest groups), and with many unorganized followers (Roberts, 2017; Weyland, 2017). 
Peron, Allende, Garcia, were charismatic leaders that made plebiscitarian (Geddes, 
1994) appeals to their electorate, while the middle class usually voted for moderate left 
or right parties. Charismatic leaders may form populist parties, buy they are usually 
weak, and do not represent the core of the populist strategy, that is strongly linked 
to leaders and movements. Populism usually relies upon some grassroots organiza-
tions, with a low organizational structure. There may be business associations7 and 
(for example, Peronist) unions, but these interest groups mostly depend on the popu-
list leader; also parties or institutions (parliaments and governments) have a limited 
role and usually ratify decisions of the populist leader.
 ♦ This political relation leads to a strong mobilization process (mostly from above) of 
the masses, within the so-called movimientismo8 (Alberti, 1996), that is the interface con-
cept of populism. Those who mobilize themselves have a precise socio-cultural origin, 
that Ostiguy (2017) has defined as the “low” of the society, and have a sociological 
(people excluded from formal work and urban centers), an economic (the poorest 
sectors of the population) and a cultural (all those with a low level of instruction) 
dimension. On the low, people use a politically incorrect, raw, coarse, inhibited lan-
guage, based on anti-politics, and they fight against the “high”: moderate right or 
left parties. Among the low, there are also poor immigrants; populists are inclusive 
and not xenophobic (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013, De La Torre 2016, Garcia Augus-
tin and Briziarelli, 2018). Among the high, there are those foreigners who reject the 
expansion of public expenditure: the supporters of market reforms, the promoters 
5. Also Mudde (2004) emphasized 
the Manichean worldview of po-
pulism. Laclau (2005) has been the 
Argentinian political philosopher 
who inspired post-1989 populism, 
especially that of Nestor and Cris-
tina Kirchner. He theorized the 
radical left strategy of opposing te-
chnocratic elites, austerity, the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and neo-liberalismo.
6. Di Tella (1990) defined populism 
as a political movement with a high 
mass support from urban (and ru-
ral) workers, a mobilization pro-
cess from above, the central role of 
(personal or charismatic) leaders 
(coming from the middle class), a 
nationalistic economic ideology 
and an anti/status quo program. 
On populism and nationalism, see 
De Cleen (2017).
7. Kaufman and Stallings (1991) 
emphasized that pre-1989 radi-
cal (leftist) populism obtained a 
strong backing from domestica-
lly oriented (especially industrial) 
business sectors, while it isolated 
rural agro-exporters and foreign 
multi-national enterprises.
8. Movimientismo is characterized 
by: charismatic leadership, vertical 
and horizontal solidarity, antago-
nism towards the political enemy 
(Alberti, 1996). According to Asla-
nidis (2017), populist movements 
may be new, or may be coopted by 
pre-existing parties. Jansen (2011) 
linked populism to a political pro-
ject aimed at mobilizing margina-
lized social sectors.
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of austerity (the IMF or the European Union), and the trans-national finance. This 
mobilization process also needs a strict control of the media to disseminate populist 
values (De la Torre, 2018); populism usually leads to limit the freedom of the press. 
In sum, populism is based on: a Manichean ideology with a binary cosmology of the 
world; the expansion of the public expenditure with damaging effects (very high in-
flation rates) on the economy; charismatic leaders making plebiscitary appeals to the 
population, with a limited role of intermediate actors (interests groups or parties) and 
institutions (parliaments or governments); a high mobilization process from above lea-
ding to a strong movimientismo of the lower sectors of the population. 
If the populist political culture is fully applied in all its features, the political consequence 
is a high threat to liberal (and representative) democracy (Pasquino, 2005), and political 
conflict may lead to either a deep political crisis, or a transition to a hybrid or authorita-
rian regime, together with anti-populist reactions such as military coups or even wars: 
the populist political cycle (Sachs, 1989). In Latin America, populism was usually applied by 
illiberal (or limited) democracies during the Cold War, because populist parties were of-
ten winning democratic elections, with a strong support by the “low” of the population: 
marginal urban (more than rural) sectors and informal workers. The political effects of 
populism in Latin America will be analyzed in the conclusions of this article. 
Which is the main theoretical (and empirical) problem of populism? In the literature 
(Weyland, 2017) the economic feature of populism has been erased9. Many radical righ-
tist parties have been defined as populist (Pappas, 2019). It often happens that: first, also 
rightist xenophobic parties have charismatic leaders; second, they have plebiscitarian 
relations with the masses; third, those who mobilize in favor of xenophobic parties are 
the “low” of the society (Ostiguy, 2017). On one hand, xenophobic parties do not expand 
public expenditure, that is a typical leftist economic politics. On the other hand, lef-
tist populist governments are not xenophobic, even if they divide the world into us and 
them, low and high; but excluded immigrants are within “the low” and pertain to the 
electoral base of populist parties. Populists are against those pro-globalization foreig-
ners that are part of “the high” of society, are in favor of austerity, and are against the 
expansion of the public expenditure10. 
One of the main assumptions of those scholars who theorize the existence of both righ-
tist and leftist populist parties is that populism is above the right-left cleavage. That is 
analytically incorrect - it is a form of conceptual stretching - and empirically false. Leftist 
populist parties aim at expanding public expenditure and are not xenophobic. Rightist 
parties are xenophobic and not want to expand public expenditure. But it is sure that 
low sectors of society usually vote either for the populist left or for the xenophobic right. 
Thus, even if the right-left cleavage is still alive, it may happen that populist parties are 
voted by both radical right and radical left electors. That is a big change, because in the 
past radical right electors had always been against socialist parties, that were influenced 
by Marxism (even if they were not violent like the communists). The right has always 
defended capitalism; liberals were in favor of radical, while conservators (like Trump or 
Berlusconi) of moderate laissez faire. 
Roberts (1995, 2007) and Weyland (1996, 1999, 2001) theorized the existence also of 
neo-liberal populism, like those of Menem in Argentina or Fujimori in Peru, but that 
is conceptual stretching. According to Kaltwasser (2019), also conservative leaders like 
Berlusconi or Trump are populist. Menem and Fujimori made plebiscitary appeals to 
the population to apply market reforms (Geddes 1994), which were obstructed by parlia-
ments, but they were the contrary of populism. Menem and Fujimori can be labeled as 
9. Weyland (2017) wrote about the de-
cline of notions of economic populism, or 
of the deficiency of counter-arguments 
(Weyland, 2003). Other political 
scientists (Knight, 1998, Cammack 
2000, Demmers, Fernandez Jilber-
to, Hogenboom, 2001; Ellner, 2003) 
neglected economic factors. Zanat-
ta (2013) and De La Torre (2017) cla-
rified the evolution from left to right 
populism, but accepted both defini-
tions. In fact, leftist scholars cannot 
accept that a negative label like po-
pulism may be applied only to the 
left. According to Zuquete (2018), 
as populism is often perceived as a 
negative label, there must be a good 
(leftist) populism and a bad (rightist) 
populism. Then, definitions linking 
populism to the expansion of public 
expenditure are considered old fas-
hion, i.e. positivistic, that contradict 
the values of post-modernism.
10. Rodrik (2018) emphasized how 
(leftist) populist actors are against 
globalization. Rightist conservative 
or xenophobic parties are critical 
of globalization, but their cosmo-
logies are not Manichean. The right 
supports a moderate laissez faire, 
with some trade and investments’ 
protectionism and with limited pri-
vatizations to defend national pro-
ducers, as national governments 
should maintain their control on 
global and regional organizations.
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plebiscitarian liberal leaders, as they favored those technocratic governments and laissez 
faire reforms, which have always been rejected by populist leaders. Instead, other scho-
lars made a clear distinction between liberalism and populism (Edwards, 2019); Drake11 
(1982) linked the definition of populism to economic nationalism, like Kaufman and 
Stallings (1991), Conniff (1999) argued that neo-liberalism and neo-populism remained 
antithetical to each other also in the 1990’s. 
In the United States, no fully populist (with all the four above-mentioned features) politi-
cal party or leader has ever existed, even if some of them have been labeled as populist. 
The emphasis on the expansion of public expenditure has never been formulated, even if 
some radical leaders of the Democratic Party (like Jesse Jackson) pressed for more effec-
tive redistributive policies: probably, to compensate the weak American welfare state12. 
The Italian case shows that governments may be the outcome of an alliance of the “two 
low” (rightist xenophobic Lega and leftist populist Movimento 5 Stelle) against the “two 
high” (moderate left Partito Democratico and moderate right Forza Italia): see the typo-
logy of Ostiguy (2017). Conte’s coalition in 2018/19 was based on an exchange; the po-
pulist party accepted some anti-immigration measures; the xenophobic party accepted 
some increase of the public expenditure (Chiarini, 2020). It was probably the first coa-
lition among the two “low” in a Western country. However, that coalition was dissolved 
in August 2019. 
Socio-Cultural Origin
High
Low
Political Ideology
Left Right
Social-democrat parties Conservative or Liberal parties
Populist parties Xenophobic parties
In sum, the main assumption of this essay is that leftist Manicheanism at first took 
the (neo-Marxist) form of socialism, and then it turned into (post-Marxist) populism. 
This process materialized first in Latin America during the Cold War, through a mix 
among partial socialism, trade protectionism and populism (with Peron in Argentina 
and Allende in Chile), and then (after 1989 and especially after the 2008 economic cri-
sis) in Europe: with economic populism only and without any socialism. Rodrik (2018) 
linked the recent episodes of populism, like Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece, to 
the post-1989 hyper-globalization. The only post-1989 exception is Venezuela, where Cha-
vez and Maduro applied the same mix of partial socialism, protectionism and populism 
of Allende and Peron during the cold war, and Venezuela turned into an authoritarian 
regime (see the conclusions). 
11. Drake (1982) emphasized that 
popu lism is characterized by these 
features: a personalistic leader-
ship, high political mobilization of 
followers with a multi-class origin, 
and nationalistic economic policies.
12. People’s Party of the 1890’s was 
an agrarian, more than populist, 
party. Huey Long, Lousiana’s go-
vernor of the 1930’s, has probably 
been the American leader with the 
closest political program to popu-
lism, but his political career has 
been too short, as he was killed in 
1935. All the other rightist Ameri-
can leaders (Wallace, Buchanan, 
Trump…) have never been popu-
list, but were radical conservative 
or xenophobic politicians. The Tea 
party has always been against the 
increase of public expenditure. For 
examples of American populist lea-
ders or parties, see Lowndes (2017, 
2018), Savage (2018).
Populism 
in Latin America
Macro-economic populism has been coupled with Import-Substitution Industriali-
zation (ISI), launched in Latin America after the 1929 economic crisis and the Second 
World War (1940/45). Industrial imports from advanced countries had decreased in 
that period, and Latin American populist governments (mostly within illiberal demo-
cracies) applied ISI policies, that were based on two instruments: high tariff barriers 
against industrial imports from the advanced countries and public subsidies to the local 
industry. At the same time, for example in Argentina with Peron (1946/55), agriculture 
exports were taxed. The first phase of ISI lasted from 1929/45 to mid-1950’s; ISI policies 
were coupled with macro-economic populism (strong public expenditure increase) and 
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also with partial socialism, that is to say with some nationalizations aiming at damaging 
multi-national firms. Those economic policies were launched especially thanks to the 
intellectual support of CEPAL (Comision Economica para America Latina) economists, 
of the United Nations in Santiago de Chile; their neo-Marxist ideology was based on the 
hypothesis that dependence from advanced countries had to be removed, through ma-
cro-economic populism, ISI and economic nationalism. Before 1929, post-colonial La-
tin American economies were more integrated with those of the USA and their former 
European empires, with the typical neo-colonial division of labor: imports of industrial 
goods from the empires and export of (agriculture and mineral) primary goods from the 
colonies (Fossati, 1997).
The first phase of ISI led to an economic crisis, with high rates of inflation. Thus, some 
middle-class (desarrollistas) parties won the elections against populist leaders; Ku-
bitschek (1956/61) and Goulart (1961/64) were elected in Brazil; Frondizi (1958/62) and 
Illia (1963/66) in Argentine. They applied the second phase of ISI, that lasted from mid-
50s to the beginning of the 1970’s. Desarrollismo maintained protectionist ISI policies, 
but tried to stop economic populism and partial socialism. Desarrollistas parties tried to 
attract multi-national corporations, but without supporting exports (like Asian tigers); 
they tried to appeal them to sell their goods in the Latin American protected markets. 
Those democratic experiments also failed, under the pressure of the mobilizations of 
the lower sectors of the population. In mid-60s in both Brazil (1964-85) and Argentine 
(1966-73) there were military coups of the so-called dictablandas, to continue with the 
above-mentioned second phase of ISI. However, renewed popular mobilizations pushed 
also those military leaders to abandon power (in Argentine but not in Brazil), and there 
was a wave of neo-populism. Allende won the elections in Chile (in 1970), and Peron in 
Argentina (in 1973). The second phase of ISI had ended, and there was a return to both 
macro-economic populism and partial socialism, together with the radicalization of 
some terrorist communist groups: especially in Cono Sur countries (Argentine, Chile 
and Uruguay), but also in Colombia (FARC) and Peru (Sendero Luminoso). In Peru, the 
radical left-wing armed forces applied a sort of rural socialism, coupling populism with 
the nationalization of private property in the agriculture sector, whose lands were orga-
nized in cooperatives under Velasco Alvarado (1968-75); instead, the (private) industrial 
firms were still favored by the protectionist ISI policies (Cavarozzi, 1992). 
Then, there was a new wave of military coups (in Chile in 1973, in Uruguay in 1975 and 
in Argentine in 1976) of highly repressive anti-communist -supported by the US republi-
can president Nixon- military regimes (dictaduras); populism and partial socialism were 
stopped, but ISI policies were abandoned only in Chile. Pinochet implemented radical 
laissez-faire reforms: not from the beginning (in 1973), but only from 1976 to 1981 with 
the government of the so-called Chicago boys. From 1982 to 1989, Buchi’s government 
applied moderate laissez-faire policies in Chile. Instead, Argentina and Uruguay coupled 
ISI with austerity programs, but did not implement privatizations and trade or finan-
cial opening. The same happened to most of democratic governments of the 1980´s. 
Austerity, negotiated with the IMF after the foreign debt crisis of 1982, and trade (and 
investments’) protectionism led to a deep economic recession in the so-called década 
pérdida. In those years, Peruvian Garcia’s government returned to macro-economic 
populism and to high public expenditure, declaring a moratorium to creditor banks and 
refusing an agreement with the IMF, with devastating effects on the economy. Instead, 
Argentinian Alfonsin’s government made a compromise between austerity and popu-
lism, with both Plan Austral (1985) and Plan Primavera (1988), and the outcome was 
another deep economic crisis (Fossati, 1997). 
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Only after 1989, laissez-faire reforms were launched by all Latin American governments, 
with privatizations, trade and financial opening. ISI policies, populism and partial so-
cialism were abandoned and Latin America experienced a decade of growth, also favo-
red by the 1989 Brady Plan that introduced a discount (of 20/30%) of the foreign debt 
that had to be payed to creditor banks (Fossati, 1997). Many countries were governed 
by the left (Aylwin, Frei, Lagos and Bachelet in Chile or Lula in Brazil), but their deci-
sion making process was more institutionalized and thus not populist (Schamis, 2006). 
Some rightist presidents (like Menem in Argentina or Fujimori in Peru) applied market 
reforms, but kept using the same plebiscitarian decision-making style of leftist popu-
lism of the past. Venezuela returned to populism, protectionism and partial socialism 
with Chavez’ hybrid regime (1999-2013) and with Maduro’s (since 2013) authoritarian go-
vernment. Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina (with Nestor and Cristina Kirchner) applied 
more moderate populism than Venezuela. 
Populism 
before 1989: 
Argentina (Peron), 
Chile (Allende), 
Peru (Garcia) 
Peron became president in June 1946 and launched an economic policy with a deep in-
crease of both public expenditure (at the federal and the provinces levels) and money 
creation (by the nationalized Central Bank), with a strong redistribution program, man-
aged by Evita, together with high increases in wages. There was a big nationalizations’ 
campaign: for example, in energy (oil, gas, nuclear plants, water, electricity), iron metal-
lurgy, tele-communications and (railways, ports, ships and airplanes) transports. Peron 
implemented a sort of partial socialism. In 1949, the inflation rate reached 34%, and in the 
early 1950’s there was a deep economic crisis. In 1955, a military coup pushed Peron to go 
into exile. In 1973, Peron won again the presidential elections. Populist economic poli-
cies (with wage increases, price and exchange rate controls) and a strong ISI program 
were re-launched by Peron in 1973, and were continued by his second wife Isabel after 
his death in July 1974. The mismanagement of the economy and the increase of violence 
in the society, led to the highest peak of the inflation rate with 430% in 1976; the budget 
deficit in 1975 had reached 16%. In June 1975, a devaluation of the exchange rate was de-
cided, but it had no relevant economic effect. In 1976, the real wages level had decreased 
of 50% since 1973 (Sturzenegger, 1991).
Allende started his mandate in 1970 and formed the Unidad Popular government with 
the support of both communists and socialists. Public expenditure (within a deep redis-
tribution project) and real wages increased, prices and the exchange rate were contro-
lled, and a nationalization program in the copper industry and in the agrarian sector, 
according to the socialist ideology, was launched. Thus, Allende probably implemented 
the deepest form of partial socialism. Inflation rate reached 35% in 1970 and 1971, then 
200% in 1972 and 600% in 1973. The rate of deficit over GDP started with 3% in 1970, then 
increased to 11% in 1971, 13% in 1972 and 25% in 1973. In 1972, a devaluation of the exchan-
ge rate was decided, but it did not produce any relevant economic effect. Thus, Allende 
lost the support of the middle class, and there was a strong increase of violence in the 
society. In 1973, real wages were 70% of those of 1970 (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1989). 
Garcia became president of Peru in August 1985, as the leader of APRA (Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana), the Peruvian leftist populist party. During the left wing 
military regime of Velasco Alvarado, the land (but not the industry) was nationalized; 
also Peru had a memory of partial socialism. Garcia’s economic program was based on a 
high increase of public expenditure and of real wages, a strong money creation program 
of the central bank, controls on prices, interest rate and exchange rate. He declared a 
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moratorium on foreign debt and refused to make an agreement with the IMF. In July 
1987, Garcia tried to implement a partial socialist project, aiming at nationalizing the 
banking system, but the parliament rejected his proposal. The economic effects of his 
policies were devastating. Inflation grew at 1722% in 1988, 2775% in 1989, and 7600% in 
1990. The budget deficit increased from 2,4% in 1985, to 4,9% in 1986, 6,5% in 1987, and 
5,3% in 1988. In 1989, real wages values had decreased of 50% since 1985 (Dornbusch and 
Edwards, 1989).
Populism after 1989: 
Venezuela (Chávez, 
Maduro), Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Argentina 
After 1989, most of Latin American governments (except Cuba) applied laissez faire re-
forms, and ISI has been abandoned, together with populism and partial socialism (Fos-
sati, 1997). Then, Chavez tried to stop liberal reforms: first with his attempted coup in 
1992; then after his election in 1998. He relaunched economic populism, protectionism 
and partial socialism, trying to push other countries (Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and 
neo-Peronist Argentina from 2003 to 2015) to imitate his reforms (Edwards, 2019)13. 
In Venezuela, Chávez first staged a military coup in 1992 (with nearly 250 deaths), pu-
shing president Perez to fire the IESA boys, that were implementing successful laissez -
faire reforms since 1990 (Fossati, 1997). Then, he won the presidential elections in 1998 and 
changed the constitution in 1999; Chávez was a very charismatic leader, making repeated 
plebiscitary appeals to the population; he also strongly relied upon decrees. Thanks to oil 
exports revenues, he increased public expenditure, money supply, and financed social po-
licies, aiming at benefiting the lower sectors of the population, within the so-called petro 
socialism, which was another form of partial socialism; also prices and the exchange rate 
were controlled. Chávez strongly limited democracy, and Venezuela became a hybrid 
regime; from 1999 to 2008 Freedom House’s (FH, 2019) performances were around 3 or 
4. The lower sectors of the population represented his electorate, while the middle class 
voted for the opposition parties. In 2002, there was an attempt of electoral revolution, 
leaded by Carmona (head of the main industrial business association), and diplomatically 
supported by the USA, but if failed. Chavez increased again his presidential powers after 
the constitutional referendum of December 2007; he also put the armed forces under the 
direct rule of the chief of state, and limited the freedom of the media; Venezuela became 
a case of hyper-presidentialism (Hawkins 2010). In February 2009, the terms’ limits for his 
re-elections were removed by another referendum. FH’s performances reached the level of 
5 from 2009 to 2013. In 2008, the inflation rate was 27,5% (Hidalgo, 2009). Budget deficit 
was around 5% in 2010, and reached 15% in 2012. Chávez died of cancer in 2013. 
His successor, Maduro, did not have his charisma, and Venezuela became an authorita-
rian regime, with a performance of 5,5% in 2016/7 and of 6,5% in 2018, according to the 
FH. Inflation rate was 56,2% in 2013; 275% in 2015, 800% in 2016, 4000% in 2017, then 
since 2018 the government is not publishing inflation rates anymore. Budget deficit was 
around 20% in 2015/6, and 30% in 2017/8. Since 2013 also the oil prices started to de-
crease. Real wages have declined of 75% after 2013. The middle class started to mobilize 
again (since 2014), especially against the new constitutional referendum of July 2017, 
and against the presidential elections of May 2018, that were considered unfair because 
of many electoral irregularities. In January 2019, the president of the parliament Guaidò 
leaded another wave of protests and proclaimed himself president of Venezuela, but the 
regime reacted with repression; there have been nearly 300 deaths since 2014. There has 
also been a strong increase of violence, and four million people (13% of the population) 
left Venezuela. 
13. This did not happen because of 
popular dissatisfaction with mar-
ket reforms or of social inequality, 
but because of a success paradox; 
market reforms improved econo-
mic conditions; thus many electors 
returned to the old (anti-American) 
populism, also because post-1989 
external constraints were absent 
in the 2000’s (Remmer, 2012). Pa-
nizza (2005) emphasized that after 
1989 many leftist parties imple-
mented moderate market reforms. 
On the various lefts, see Roberts 
(2006), Levitsky and Roberts (2011), 
and Weyland (2009, 2013).
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In the 2000’s a new wave of rentier populism (Mazzuca, 2013) started; rents were gua-
ranteed by oil (in Venezuela and Ecuador) and by gas (in Bolivia), and permitted the 
expansion of public expenditure and the launching of vast social policies. Morales won 
the Bolivian presidential elections in 2005, and in 2006 he nationalized the gas industry 
that had been privatized in the 1990’s; his government, with his party Movimiento al So-
cialismo (MAS), became a case of etno-populism (Madrid 2008). In autumn 2019, after his 
election for a fourth term and many popular pretests against him, Morales resigned and 
went into exile in Mexico; in May 2020 there will be new presidential elections. Bolivian 
FH (2019) political performance has always been 3 since 2003, but worsened to 3.5 only in 
2014 and 2015. The main economic indicators remained under control; the inflation rate 
reached 14% in 2008, 10% in 2011, and then it decreased at 5%. The ratio of public debt 
over Gross Domestic Product (GDP) started with 80% in 2005, then it decreased at 38% 
in 2010, and increased again at 50% in 2017. Correa won the Ecuadorian presidential 
elections in 2006, and implemented macro-economic populism, but he limited democratic 
performances, changing the constitution. Ecuador became a case of hyper-presidentia-
lism; both the power of the judiciary and the freedom of the media were limited (De la 
Torre and Lemos 2016). Another more moderate leader (Moreno) of his party Alianza 
PAIS (Patria Altiva I Soberana) won the 2017 presidential elections. In July 2018, a judge 
ordered Correa’s arrest, but he went into exile in Belgium and did not return to Ecuador. 
Correa’s FH (2019) political indicators were 3 since 2000, then worsened to 3,5 in 2014, 
but with Moreno they improved to 3 in 2018. The main economic indicators remained 
under control; inflation rate started with 3% in 2006, reached 8% in 2008, was main-
tained at around 5%, then in 2017 reached 0,4%. The ratio of public debt over GDP was 
38% in 2006, 23% in 2010, 33% in 2015, and 45% in 2017.
In Argentina, after the 2002 economic crisis with the president (of the Radical party) De 
la Rua, the Peronist party won the following presidential elections with Nestor Kirchner 
-who governed from 2003 to 2007- and his wife Cristina Kirchner -who governed from 
2007 to 2015-. Argentina had no energy rents; the only solution to get the resources to 
increase public expenditure was to raise export taxes to rural producers. They had been 
reduced at 5-10% in the 1990s; after 2002, they were raised at 20%; Nestor increased them 
at around 25% and Cristina at around 35% in 2008; this decision led to a deep conflict with 
the agro-exporters. The inflation rate remained at 10% with Nestor, and reached 20,5% 
with Cristina; the ratio of public debt over GDP was 150% in 2002, reached 60% in 2005 
and remained at 40/5% in the 2010s. Kirchner’s Argentine political performances have 
been good (2/2) (FH 2019). Argentine economic performances have been more consistent 
with Nestor Kirchner, whose export-led economic policies were defined neo-desarrollistas, 
coupled to moderate social policies and neo-corporatist relations with interest groups. 
Cristina returned to orthodox populism, with radical social policies and plebiscitarian 
relations with interest groups; Central Bank’s independence was weakened, and oil com-
pany YPF was re-nationalized in 2012 (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007, Levitsky and Murillo, 
2008, Wylde 2011, 2016, Lupu 2016). In October 2019, Fernandez of the Peronist party 
became the new president. He raised again taxes to agro-exporters and increased public 
expenditure, but in the first months of his mandate, he implemented a moderate left 
economic policy, like Nestor Kirchner. 
The cases of Morales, Correa, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner show that Latin American 
populists have learned something, as the main economic indicators (like inflation rate) 
remained under control, even if there has been an increase of public expenditure and 
budget deficit (Edwards, 2019). This moderate populism has not had negative effects on 
politics; Argentina is still a liberal democracy. Bolivia and Ecuador remained hybrid re-
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gimes, because Correa and Morales went into exile and there was not any authoritarian 
transition; however, both countries had had similar political performances even before 
etno-populism. Instead, Venezuela’s radical populism has had devastating effects on the 
economy, and Venezuela became a hybrid regime with Chavez and an authoritarian one 
with Maduro (Mazzuca, 2013).
Conclusions 
on populism and 
plebiscitarianism 
The four cases of Latin American mainstream populism (Peron in Argentina, Allende in 
Chile, Garcia in Peru, and Chávez/Maduro in Venezuela) show these features. First, po-
pulist economic policies bring to the expansion of public expenditure, money supply and 
redistributive policies, then to partial socialism with some targeted nationalizations, 
and to trade and financial protectionism. Second, populist leaders make plebiscitary 
appeals to the lower sectors of the population, leading to a deep conflict with the high/
middle classes. Third, the economic outcome is a devastating economic crisis. Fourth, 
the political effect of populism were hybrid regimes (with Peron) in the Cold War, and 
an authoritarian one after 1989 in Venezuela (with Maduro). Fifth, there was an increase 
of violent conflict in the society, with: the extreme right vs (communist) extreme left 
cleavage before 1989 in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay; the diffusion of estallidos sociales 
in Peru in 1989-90 after Garcia’s economic chaos (Fossati, 1997); the 2010s popular pro-
tests against Maduro in Venezuela. 
How did mainstream populist experiments end? Peron’s and Allende’s governments 
finished with military golpes, supported by the USA, that applied the diplomacy of the 
“lesser evil”; when there was the danger of a communism, real-politik pushed the USA to 
support military golpes (Fossati, 2017). Garcia’s populism ended thanks to 1989 and to the 
presidential elections of 1990. The current economic and political conflict in Venezuela 
has not been resolved. After Chavez’ death in 2013, there were many protests, which were 
repressed by Maduro; Venezuela became a case of competitive authoritarianism (Levits-
ky and Loxton 2018). The outcome of post-1989 mainstream populism is a post-communist 
authoritarian regime. The paradox is that Venezuela never had a communist regime in 
the past, like Cuba, but the economic policies and the political performances of these 
two regimes are similar right now (FH, 2019), with limits to both economic and politi-
cal freedoms (Fossati 2017). The USA and the European governments have abandoned 
real-politik, and only reacted with (soft) diplomatic pressure, that has not produced re-
levant outcomes. 
The other cases of populism, with Correa in Ecuador, Morales in Bolivia, Cristina (but 
not Nestor) Kirchner -whose political experience, even if public expenditure increased, 
was closer to neo-corporatism (Wylde, 2011)- in Argentina, showed that the main eco-
nomic indicators (especially inflation rate) have remained under control. Even if there 
was an increase of public expenditure and budget deficits, the effects of populism on 
the economy were not devastating. Thus, if populist presidents implement moderate 
economic policies, the effects on politics are not negative. For example, Correa and Mo-
rales did not push their countries towards authoritarianism, like Chavez and Maduro 
in Venezuela; thus, Ecuador and Bolivia are still hybrid regimes. Argentinian Peronists 
were defeated in 2015 by Macri, and then they won again with Fernandez in 2019; thus, 
democracy resisted. In sum, Latin American populism usually leads to either illiberal 
democracies or hybrid regimes, because of: plebiscitarianism and low powers of parties 
or interest groups; high personalization and low institutionalization of politics; limits 
to the freedom of the media and to the access to internet. However, negative consequen-
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ces in politics have also been produced by non-populist governments in Latin America. 
The devastating effects of populism on democracy have been produced only by leftist 
Manichean macro-economic populism, that has been denied by most of political scien-
tists (Roberts, 1995; Weyland, 2001). If public expenditure is strongly expanded, toge-
ther with partial socialism, the outcome is a deep economic crisis with high inflation 
rates, and a threat to democracy. Instead, if populist presidents turn moderate when 
they govern, the outcome is a form of (softened) “partial” populism. At the same time, 
partial populism did not bring to authoritarian regimes, instead of orthodox populism, 
with Chavez and Maduro in Venezuela. Thus, Argentine has always remained a demo-
cracy, while Bolivia and Ecuador are still “hybrid regimes”, even if political conflict has 
increased with two illiberal presidents like Correa and Morales. 
Here is a typology, that summarizes the different cases of plebiscitarianism: 
Ideology
Radical 
Moderate
Political culture 
Right Left
Xenophobic Plebiscitarianism Orthodox Populism
Conservative or Liberal Plebiscitarianism Partial Populism
In orthodox (macro-economic) populism, there is both plebiscitarianism and the increase 
of the public expenditure and of the inflation rate (with Peron, Allende, Garcia, Chavez 
and Maduro). In partial populism, there is plebiscitarianism, but the increase of the pu-
blic expenditure and of the inflation rate remains under control, and macro-economic 
populism is softened (with Syriza in Greece, Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy, Correa, Mo-
rales, and Cristina Kirchner). The political cultures of the right are not strictly populist, 
because there is not the increase of public expenditure, but there is still plebiscitaria-
nism: the moderate Conservative (Trump and Berlusconi), the moderate Liberal (Menem 
and Fujimori), and the radical Xenophobic (Salvini’s Lega in Italy and Orban in Hungary). 
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